Introduction
The rapid growth of organic agriculture has led to China having the fourth largest land area dedicated to organic cultivation. In 2011, China had a total organic agricultural land of1.9 millim hectares (IFOAM [1] The Dai Cooperative and its members came to the following agreements: I) The cooperative wuuld provide Kosbihikari rice seeds to its members for free; 2) The cooperative would provide free teclmical guidance throughout lhe entire production proceas of Kmbihikari rice; 3) The cooperative woold pay its members a fiaed atllOlDlt of money for their production, as much as the market value of 600 kg of cooveotional rice per acre; atrer sales, lhe cooperative wuuld draw 10"/o to 15% of lhe reveoue (as cmnmon reaerve fimd), deduct lhe total coat, and lhen dislribure lhe profits to its members; 4) The cooperative members must striclly follow lhe rules of orgonic rice cultivation provided by the cooperative; or else, lhe cooperative bad lhe right to refuse to make payments; 5) Membership files of 300 yoao per acre for one share in lhe cooperative would be collected frmn peasant households.
By 2012, 94.7% ofhousebokls (820 households) in Dai Village bad joined lhe Dai Cooperative. The remsining 5.3% of hoosebokls bad not joined because part of lhe paddy field in Yiltangebong Natural Village, near a ebernical factory, was not suitsble for organic fiaming. 
2) Mauagement structure

2) Guidance for rice production
Al1hoogh rice pmdoction is led by 1he leaders of 1he operatiog teama, specific work in 1he fields is dooe by fiumer households on 1heir own fimu1and. 
3) Management for other organic cultivations
Far the cultivation of other organic products (Table 6 ), such as organic peaches, vegetables, orchards and tea, the strategy is to con1ract well develqled fields to those farmers who are willing to take ova. This strategy is different from the paddy rice system. Specifically, the Dai Cooperative initially 1ransfers land from farmer households to develop organic fimning. cons1ruct infrastructure, and bear 1he costs during the organic conversion period. Thereafter, the Dai Cooperative will hand 1hese organic fields over to the members willing to complete 1he contract. During growing process, the Dai Cooperative will take responsibility fur the overall technical guidance and field advice.
Since 2005, three local fimners have taken over the production of organic peach fields, which were first developed by ZAAS and then handed over to the Dai
Cooperative. In the same way, 12.7 hectares of orchards was contracted to 4 villagers and 1 college graduate village official and six hectares of vegetables was contracted to three villagers in 2013. Notes: Plans for growing organic 1m began at the end of2013 and is now oogoing infrastructure construction.
Marketing and Sales
In 2007, the Dai cooperative had invested five million yuan to complete a processing plant far milled rice. The main equipment was Satake pipeline rice processing equipment introduced by Japan. This equipment included nine JroCCSSing steps: removing stones and clods with a destoner; pre-cleaning; gravity selecting; pelleting and flaking; separating husked rice; size separation; color sorting; polishing; weighing and packing into bags. This set of equipment will be used only to produce organic rice produced in the Dai Cooperative. Additionally, the cooperative purchased two Knbom grain dryers in 2007 and 2011 to keep the moisture ratio of grain down to 17%.
According to the con1ract made with its members, the Dai The first three years of sales was in the neighboring cities: Jurong, Zbeojiang and Nanjing City. In 2011, the Dai
Cooperative entered into a con1ract with a Shanghai company to use the cooperative's rice to produce rice mder the brand of ''Gwmgm.ei" for them. This con1ract led to a significant increase in sales. However, this subcon1ractin.g behavior may bring potential quality risks, since once the Dai Cooperative transports 1heir products to this company, they will not be able to track 1he quality of the products. As fur sales of organic peaches, only one-third of the product was sold through the cooperative due to the lack of sales channels. The remaining two-third was left to the conttact fiumers to sell themselves. Vegetables produced were treated as conventional vegetables because they had not yet been certified as organic. Although the production of vegetables was conttacted to three fillmcrs in 2013, the Dai Cooperative promised to buy all their products at market price to minimiu: production risk far the contract fiu:mc:rs. Secondly, the Dai Cooperative has maintained two types of organic farming: for rice cultivation, it has set up eight paddy field operating teams; fur other products, 1he Dai Cooperative has entered into conttacts with members. This strategy, while ensuring the management of paddy fields, can also be effective in the development of other organic varieties in a fimners' organization.
In addition, the Dai Cooperative does not have sales capabilities to handle all of the sales of their products, though it has promised to cover all of 1he certification costs. This is partly due to the lack of profussional manpowa-.
College graduate village officials may help to a cer1Bin extent, but after they leave the village at the end of their three-year term in office, problems still exist. The lack of professional personnel seems to be the ''inborn weakness" of a fiumers' organization.
Last but not least, it should be noticed that 1he introduction of high-quality Koshihikari rice helps the cooperative expand its sales channels. However, in 1he sales of 2012, 33% of the Dai Cooperative's organic rice was packed with the mark of ''Guangmei" and then transported to the company in Shanghai. Moveover, 1he Dai Cooperative has been working on a conttact with another large company to produce organic glutinous rice in the future. When it comes to fimnland ctpanSion and seeking cooperation with other companies, questions of maintaining its independence and ensuring quality control are important fur the coopaative's future development
